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Introduction 
 Until recently, most mega sports events were held by wealthy industrialised 
countries. Because of the high costs involved in the preparation of such projects, 
insufficiently developed sports and other infrastructure and the absence of 
appropriate legal basis, hosting such events was beyond the reach of developing 
countries. The beginning of the 21st century brought significant changes in this 
respect. On the one hand, countries with relatively weaker economies, aware of 
the benefits involved, submitted their bids more readily. On the other hand, 
institutions responsible for the selection of the host country began to promote 
less wealthy countries or those in the process of economic transformation, in 
order to provide a stimulus for development. Within less than a decade there 
have been a number of examples of sporting event hosts that confirmed the 
current trend, such as: Euro 2004 in Portugal, 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, 
the decision concerning the staging of the FIFA World Cup in 2010 or, finally, 
Euro 2012 in Poland and Ukraine. 
The different approaches to stadium management adopted by the individual 
cities have been presented in this paper. In this respect particular importance 
was attached to the sources of income that will enable maintenance of these 
venues and pay off the enormous debt incurred by the cities in connection with 
their preparation. 
The key characteristics of the arenas and the sources of their 
financing  
From among the arenas to host the 2012 European Championship only the 
Lech stadium in Poznań was actually in existence in 2007. It was undergoing 
redevelopment not necessitated by awarding of the Euro organisation to the city. 
There were also 2 other stadiums in place (the city stadium in Cracow and the 
Silesian Stadium in Chorzów) which hoped for the award of the Euro 2012 back 
in 2007. However, the candidatures of Cracow and Chorzów were rejected by 
the UEFA and ultimately those facilities could not be qualified in the Euro 2012 
stadium infrastructure. All other stadiums, i.e. in Warsaw, Wrocław, and 
Gdańsk, existed only on paper, in the form of preliminary designs (Table 4.1). 
 
Table 1. 
Characteristics of the stadiums developed under Euro 2012 programme in Poland  
 
Stadium  
location 
Stadium name 
Scope of works 
conducted 
Capacity 
Execution 
[in months] 
Handed over 
for use in 
Gdańsk PGE Arena erection 43 615 31 July 2011 
Poznań 
City Stadium  
in Poznań 
redevelopment 43 098 23 September 2010 
Warsaw National Stadium erection 58 500 38 December 2011 
Wrocław 
City Stadium  
in Wrocław 
erection 44 308 36 September 2011 
 
Source: the author’s own study. 
 
The largest of the all, i.e. the Warsaw stadium, earned the opinion of the most 
complex and advanced structure to be erected in connection with Euro 2012 from 
the very beginning. It was planned to replace the former Decade Stadium in 
Warsaw. Ever since its erection the stadium has become a hallmark of the 
developing capital city. Its patriotically symbolic facade brings to mind the red 
and white flag flapping in the wind. 
Execution of the stadium investments went on without any major 
disturbances. The most serious problems were encountered at the City Stadium 
in Wrocław. The investment stalled for a while because of contract termination 
with the first contractor, Mostostal Warszawa. The Max Bogl company, which 
took over, made up for the delay and completed all phases to the plan. All four 
facilities were handed over for operation at least six months before the onset of 
the tournament finals. The redevelopment of the Poznań stadium took least time. 
Construction from the scratch, on the other hand, was more time consuming. 
The National Stadium in Warsaw took the longest to complete (more than three 
years). The ground piling process alone for that largest of the facilities under 
construction lasted 6 months.  
All the listed facilities share the feature of multifunctionality reflected in 
their extensive auxiliary commercial facilities. The functions are described in 
detail in subchapter 4.3. 
All four stadiums Poland prepared for the Euro 2012 were financed from the 
public funds. The respective proportions between the centrally-provided funds 
guaranteed directly from the state budget and the funds from the municipal 
budgets of individual cities are presented in table 4.2. The table reveals that 
except for the National Stadium entirely financed from the central budget, the 
preparation of all other arenas was based mainly on the funds from the host city 
budgets. This means that the cities are the owners of the facilities and as such 
they have been burdened with the responsibility for the maintenance of the 
arenas after the Euro 2012. The substantial share of the local governments in 
financing the sports facilities stems indirectly from the fact that the actual 
expenses were larger than the original projections. The funds provided from the 
state budget were determined in fixed nominal amounts back in 2008.
1
 The 
expenditure forecasted at the time on preparation of each of the stadiums was 
lower, which automatically translated to a higher share of the central financing. 
The most severe blow of the disproportion was suffered by Wrocław, where the 
actual local expenditure exceeded the original assumptions by nearly ¾ parts. 
 
Table 2.  
The expenditure connected with the preparation of the stadiums for the Euro 2012, and 
the sources of their financing  
 
Stadium 
Central budget 
Local 
government 
budget 
Total 
expenditure 
incurred 
[PLN mln] 
Expenditure 
forecast in 
2008 
[PLN mln] 
Actual to 
forecast 
expenditure 
ratio 
[mln 
PLN] 
[%] 
[mln 
PLN] 
[%] 
Gdańsk   144   16.7 718.30 83.3   862.30   684.0 126.1% 
Poznań   110   16.3 565.56 83.7   675.56   537.0 125.8% 
Warsaw 1914 100.0 0 0 1914.00 1220.0 156.9% 
Wrocław   110   12.2 794.22 87.8   904.22   521.1 173.5% 
 
Source: The author’s own study based on the data published by Ministry of Sport and 
Tourism. 
                                           
1 Preparation and implementation of Euro 2012, Resolution of the Ministry Council No. 143/2008, 
dated 24 June 2008.  
 Since 2008 the estimates for the construction the stadiums had been 
changing continuously. This was a major obstacle in the establishment of 
specific sources of funds and the necessary amounts obtained from those 
sources. In 2012, despite the advanced stage of construction works, all host 
cities apart from Warsaw were still in the process of completing their final lists 
of sources of finance for the projects underway. 
In the case of Gdańsk, Poznań, and Wrocław, the cities’ substantial share in 
financing stadium preparation works, amounting to over 80%, required 
obtaining funds from external resources. Each of the three cities adopted a 
different solution in this respect: a forfaiting agreement, bond issue, and bank 
loan. The instruments are detailed in table 4.3. 
The most innovative solution was adopted by Gdańsk. In the case of that city 
it was more difficult to obtain a loan because of the risk of exceeding the 
statutory debt limit of 60% of the local governments' revenues. Therefore, an 
alternative method of venue financing was sought. The city chose forfaiting, 
which is a relatively common method of financing of businesses, similar to 
factoring. However, it is less commonly used by local government units in 
Poland, particularly on the scale employed in the case of Gdańsk. It might be 
interesting to look at the mechanism on which the whole operation was based. 
The procedure is presented in Figure 4.1. 
 
Table 3. 
Details of the earmarked external financing obtained by the host cities in preparation 
of the stadium facilities  
 
City Source of financing Financing details 
Gdańsk 
Forfaiting  
 selling of receivables due to city of Gdańsk 
 BIEG is the debtor, 
 purchase price: PLN 375 million, 
 grace period – 3 years (until 2012) 
 the receivable maturity term – 15 years (until 2024) 
 cost – WIBOR 3M + margin 
Revenue Bonds   value of the debt instruments – PLN 94,5 million, 
Poznań 
Bank loans and bond 
issue  
 value of the debt instruments – PLN 540 million, 
 the instruments were reached for repeatedly, 
depending on the advancement in individual 
investment tasks under the adopted investment 
programme, 
 maturity terms – maximum 15 years, 
 grace period for loans – no longer than 7 years, 
 cost – WIBOR 3M and WIBOR 6M + margin of max. 1 p.p.  
Wrocław 
Investment loan 
agreement between the 
city and the consortium 
of BRE Bank, ING Bank, 
and Nordea Polska  
 loan amount – PLN 500 mln, 
 lending period – 14 years, 
 grace period – 2 years, 
 interest rate – WIBOR 3M + margin of 0.99 p.p. 
 
Source: the author’s own study. 
 
 
Figure 1. Forfaiting mechanism used in the construction of the stadium in Gdańsk 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
The most important element of this puzzle was the transfer of ownership of 
the stadium from the municipality to a municipal company BIEG 2012. After 
this operation Gdańsk was holding only 25% of the shares. As a result, BIEG 
was obliged to pay its share of PLN 375 000 000 and transfer these funds to the 
municipality. As the company did not have such funds available, the 
municipality decided to sell this debt to Bank Pekao SA. That institution, under 
a forfaiting agreement, repaid the debt to Gdańsk, reduced by an appropriate 
discount, which made it possible to pay the contractor for the construction of the 
stadium. In exchange, BIEG is obliged to pay off the debt to the banks in 
instalments for the next 15 years. Initially, only interest – ca. PLN 26 000 000, 
but beginning from December 2012 – principal and interest payments of ca. 
PLN 43 000 000 per year. Altogether, for the PLN 375 000 000 provided by the 
2. performance of service  
 
BIEG 2012/ debtor 
General 
contractor/ 
service provider 
Municipality of 
Gdańsk/ 
creditor/ 
guarantor 
 
Bank 
consortium/ 
forfaiter 
1. signing a 
commercial contract 
3a. transfer of 75% of 
shares in the venue 
4. sale  
of the debt at 
a discount 
3b. establishment of the debt  
 5. payment for the debt 
 6. payment for the service 
 7a. repayment of 
debt with interest due 
 7b. repayment of debt with interest due in 
the event of the debtor's insolvency 
banks, BIEG has to repay ca. PLN 600 000 000. The interest rate depends on the 
WIBOR rate and now totals ca. 7% including bank margin. Thus, BIEG became 
a kind of “financial vehicle”, used by the city to obtain the required funds and 
simultaneously ensuring tax effectiveness of the project. 
The forfaiting arrangement does not transfer the risk of insolvency to the 
forfaiter. The stadium was a risky business for the banks, so the venue was not 
even encumbered with a mortgage. BIEG was not a sufficiently credible partner 
for the lending consortium, so under the agreement the municipality is 
responsible for timely repayment of debt in the event of difficulties. Should 
BIEG stop repaying its debt, the forfaiting agreement would be terminated and 
the municipality would have to pay off the debt with interest accrued within the 
specified time limit. That is why Gdańsk continues to support the municipal 
company, aware that BIEG's troubles will in fact mean difficulties for the city. 
Support is provided in several ways.  
First, the municipality decided to supply capital to the company every year. 
For example, in December 2012 Gdańsk acquired BIEG's shares for ca. PLN 
35 000 000, which allowed the company to pay the instalment due to the 
consortium. The municipality also supplies other links in the chain financing 
BIEG's activities: 
 pays for promotion of the city to the football club Lechia Gdańsk, 
which plays matches in PGE Arena and leases the stadium from the 
operator, which in turn supplies BIEG; 
 pays to the operator for advertising during major events held in the 
stadium. 
It is therefore difficult to say whether the choice of forfaiting by the 
municipality of Gdańsk was the best possible choice from the financial point of 
view. The city bears the entire financial risk, which is only apparently 
distributed over the newly established entities. The chief advantage is the 
somewhat different approach to forfaiting in terms of local government debt. 
Wrocław and Poznań resorted to more traditional forms of financing. 
Wrocław consciously resigned from bond issue opting for a bank loan. The 
decision was mainly driven by the restrictions built into the Act on Bonds. The 
loan was found to be a simpler instrument in terms of both the process of 
accumulating the contract-related documentation, and in the funds disbursement 
and repayment (i.e. the disbursement and the contract-required and law-required 
documentation). The aspects which weighed on the decision included the option 
of early loan repayment which does entail additional costs, as would have been 
the case with bond redemption before the contractually specified date.  
Modernisation of the City Stadium in Poznań was one of the investments the 
city pursued in preparation for the Euro 2012. The funds for implementation of 
the investment programme came largely from loans, typically obtained for the 
entire investment programme as a whole, and not for individual projects. Since 
the stadium project took several years to complete, it was financed from 
numerous debt instruments. Over the time, the city took loans and issued bonds 
of the 15-year maturity type, though in practice the crediting term did not exceed 
10 years.  
The approach of the host cities to the issue of managing the 
stadiums following Euro 2012 
The time of true test for the host cities came after the tournament finals 
ended. Management of huge facilities generating high maintenance costs is not 
an easy task. The hosts of earlier events of the type have already learnt the fact. 
Let us take Portugal, the host of the Euro 2004, for an example. The cities which 
had financed the construction of the stadiums from the public funds experienced 
grave problems with retaining their profitability after the Championships. The 
problem grew to such scale that the government of Portugal put forward the idea 
of pulling down some of the stadiums, the generators of the highest costs, so as 
to reduce the budget expenditure [Zawadzki, 2010, p. 176].  
Building the stadium business plan begins with selecting the operator to be 
in charge of commercialising the facility. The track record of the operation of 
the Euro 2012 dedicated facilities, though still short, shows that effective 
management of sports arenas is not easy. This is evidenced by the rapid 
succession of stadium operators in Gdańsk and Wrocław, as well as several 
dismissals of successive Presidents of the National Sport Centre (NCS) – the 
company acting on behalf and in the name of the State Treasury and responsible 
for execution of the tasks related to the construction of the National Stadium in 
Warsaw and unofficially its operator up to almost the end of the year 2012. 
Since 2013, the function has been taken over by PL 2012 +. 
The fact symptomatic of Gdańsk and Wrocław is that the cities have 
resigned from cooperation with private investors giving preference to municipal 
companies. This is contrary to the trends observed in the United States or 
Western Europe, where sport facilities of that scale end up almost exclusively in 
private hands, typically specialised companies or sports clubs. Both Gdańsk and 
Wrocław made their decisions facing ineffective management of the facilities by 
Lechia Operator and the American SMG, respectively.  
Poznań decided to entrust the management of the stadium to the consortium 
formed by Lech Poznań SA and Marcelin Management. At the moment, it is 
difficult to say which concept of the operator selection will prove best in the 
Polish reality. A comprehensive strategy to rule the use of the facilities is only in 
development. Nevertheless, one can identify the catalogue of the sources of 
income the operators put hope for. The options are connected with sports and 
non-sport activities, as well as funds from sponsors. 
 
Sport events as a source of current financing of the stadiums  
The prime source of financing is seen as organisation of sports events, 
football matches in particular. Except for the National Stadium, the other three 
arenas have been out at the use of football clubs. The fact indicates that in spite 
of the multifunctionality of the facilities, the funds earned from the fans are 
assumed to remain the regular and important source of income. In practice, 
football clubs transmit contractually specified amounts to the operators, thus 
becoming a peculiar intermediary between the fans and the operator. Out of the 
analysed clubs, Lech Poznań is the only one to have disclosed the fee paid. The 
charge is made up of two components: the fixed amount of PLN 3.1 million a 
year, and the variable portion calculated as 7.5 percent of the income generated 
on match days. The two components in aggregate add up to the total fee of ca. 
PLN 4 million per year.  
The National Stadium finds itself in the worst position, as it cannot count on 
support from any football club. The use of the arena for cup tournament matches 
may also pose a problem because of the tough safety requirements. The only 
hope for using the stadium to its designation lies in matches of the national 
representation. After the Euro 2012, the Prime Minister, Mr Donald Tusk, 
himself said he was pondering a legislative solution to the issue. The view has 
found support from Zbigniew Boniek, the newly appointed President of Polish 
Football Association (PZPN), who believes that all score-bearing matches of the 
national team should be played in the Warsaw arena.  
In the case of the other stadiums, relying on funds from football clubs carries 
a serious risk of insufficient attendance at league matches. The UEFA 
requirements as to the stadium capacities do not correspond with the actual 
demand, which is many times lower. Figure 4.2 below shows the average 
attendance at Lechia’s Extraclass matches in Gdańsk, Lech’s matches in Poznań, 
and Śląsk’s matches in Wrocław over the last three seasons. The results were 
compared against the average turnout for all clubs in the individual seasons. 
The rapid increase in the attendance at Lechia’s and Śląsk’s stadiums in the 
season of 2011/12 compared to the 2010/11 figures was due to nothing else but 
their moving to the new facilities. Consequently, one can assume that the new 
location has pertained to an increase in the number of fans by ca. 7–10 thousand. 
Comparison with the average shows that the figures are satisfactory as for the 
Polish league, yet the observed increase results in attaining the use of 1/3 of the 
stadium capacity at best (of ½ in Poznań). Another alarming symptom may be 
seen in the fact that the increase observed for individual arenas is unsteady over 
the subsequent seasons. In the case of PGE Arena the peak attendance was 
reached at Lechia’s league match with Cracovia in August 2011. The number of 
fans in the audience has never gone so high since then and in the 2012/13 season 
the average attendance was lower by 3831 (22.4 per cent) than in the 2011/12 
season. In Wrocław, the decrease in turnout at Śląsk matches is not so dramatic, 
but still substantial, amounting to 1409 people (8.54 per cent). In the same 
period the average for all stadiums also fell, but only by 371 fans (4.2 per cent). 
 
 Figure 2. Attendance at stadium in the Euro 2012 host cities  
Source: The author’s own study based on the data provided by the Ekstraklasa S.A. company. 
 
The phenomenon can be partially attributed to the so-called honeymoon 
effect describing the situation where a newly opened facility initially attracts 
accidental spectators. The latter, not counting among zealous sport fans, come to 
see the new facility itself rather than to enjoy the event. Another problem that 
still haunts the Polish arenas is safety. The connotations with football stadiums 
are frequently negative in Poland, and football fans are often equated with 
hooligans and criminals. The image obviously discourages potential visits at 
football arenas. Alas, the new Polish stadiums have not stimulated a quality of 
fan behaviour in Poland. Any improvement in this respect requires determined 
action and broadly scoped cooperation between all football clubs, the 
Ekstraklasa SA sport company, and the Polish Football Association. The 
intention to secure safety sometimes translates to absurd requirements. The 
stadium capacity offered to spectators at the league matches in Poland can serve 
as an example. It varies almost from match to match depending on the expected 
number of guest fans and the degree of risk assessed by the Police. In extreme 
cases the buffer zones separating the fans of individual football teams consume 
as many as 7–8 thousand seats. 
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Beyond any doubt, the future profitability of the new facilities will highly 
depend on participation of the football teams in the European tournaments, since 
this would intensify the frequency of the matches held, and boost interest in 
spectators wishing to see the famous footballers live. This, in turn, carries the 
need to build strong football club teams in the Euro 2012 host cities. The 
support given by the city authorities to the initiatives aimed at developing such 
teams is a factor that should not be underestimated. The above then implies that 
future use of the arenas for strictly sport-related purposes depends on the 
development of close cooperation between the clubs, sports organisations, and 
local authorities.  
 
 Non-sport sources of financing the stadiums 
Even if the fundamental condition of having a strong football club is met, 
other ways of generating income, not necessarily related to sport, should also be 
envisaged as early as in the concept-development phase. Multifunctionality of 
the erected facilities offers a plausible solution to the issue. Multifunctional 
arenas can be swiftly transformed from football grounds to a track and field 
stadium or concert hall. Poland resorts to the experience of other countries in 
this respect. The new facilities erected are intended to serve different functions, 
non-sport included. The plans envisage the arrangement of shopping and 
congress centres, cinema halls, recreational facilities etc. to attract people other 
than football fans. A rather unusual source of income of non-sport origin 
generated on all Euro 2012 areas are guided tours thereof. On an event day the 
car parks around the stadiums are tolled. Frequently too, opportunities to let the 
facilities out to companies for their business events are taken advantage of.  
Gdańsk PGE Arena can serve as a good example of using the stadium to 
non-sport purposes. The city authorities had sought the answer to the question 
on the possible ways of managing a modern sports facility effectively long before 
the arena was handed over for operation. In search for solutions, they invited 
operators administering large stadiums in Western Europe. It was assumed from 
the very start that the facility would also be used for non-sport purposes, music 
concerts in particular. Additional income is planned from the lease of VIP boxes 
and seats, and commercial space for shops, pubs and restaurants. Further plans 
envisage opening one of the Tri-City’s largest fitness clubs on the stadium 
estate, a fan shop museum of the Lechia Gdańsk club, a sports shop, and a centre 
of entertainment. A professional rollerblade track planned to encircle in the 
arena is intended to provide an extra attraction.  
The concept of using the Wrocław arena is somewhat different. The 
Wrocław 2012 company anticipates that the prime income-maximising 
components will consist in the sale of stadium-offered products through the 
lease of 10 000 m² of commercial floor. The tenants are free to develop the 
leased space in any desired way. The added value offered here is the facility’s 
excellent location enabling quick access to it from all major quarters of the city 
and from abroad: Czech Republic and Germany. This is due to the site’s vicinity 
on the Wrocław Motorway Ring Road. A major opportunity stems from the 
option of letting out the business club, i.e. the largest luxury banquet hall in this 
part of Poland, the especially fitted exclusive boxes perfectly suitable for 
holding birthday or wedding parties, or the conference centre. The operators see 
yet another valuable source of income in the modern Data Centre, the server 
room of which is fitted in the stands. The room is targeted to hold the servers of 
banks and insurance companies, protected and monitored, equipped with air 
conditioning and a special gas fire extinguishing installation. The Wrocław 
stadium is the only area in Poland which has more than half of its business 
boxes sold as early as in the initial stage of its operation. The operator 
emphasises that the lease of commercial space should be much more lucrative 
than, say, organisation of mass cultural events. Therefore, the lease of the 
facility for cultural events is ranked as a less significant source of income. 
The situation in the case of the Poznań stadium is similar. The operator is 
unwilling to hold non-sport mass events because of their sizable costs, 
uncertainty of income, and no sponsors or city’s support in this respect. The 
solution adopted in Poznań, unique in the national scale, consists is the 
engagement of the local community of the neighbouring districts in making the 
decision on the way the nearest vicinities of the stadium are to be developed. 
The issue was publicly consulted twice in the year 2012.  
To complement the picture let us mention that the National Stadium offers 
a hall capable to accommodate two thousand people for the future conference 
centre, eight thousand square meters of office space, and floor designed for 
shops and restaurants. At the time of the European Championship the space 
served the tournament housing e.g. a huge media centre. The estate is also to be 
complemented with a fitness club. NCS, in its function of the site operator, 
focuses on large concert events, even though it sees conference space, much in 
demand, as the main source of income. 
Concluding from the above, the concepts cherished by the operators of all 
four facilities are relatively similar. The prime source of income is seen to come 
from the lease of floor for non-sport purposes, and lease of commercial space. 
However, in addition to the aforementioned, there are other commonly 
employed methods of income generation. The individual cities place their hope 
with the so-called Tax Increment Financing (TIF). The application of this source 
is connected with the expected future increase in the value of property in the 
neighbourhood of the venue. As a result, the municipality may count on an 
increase of the property tax base, translating into higher tax receipts for the 
budget. Thus, the land assigned as the project site is situated in less developed 
districts of the city, where property prices are relatively low and therefore more 
likely to increase, to the local government's benefit.  
PGE Arena in Gdańsk is a good example in this context. The stadium was 
built in Letnica – a poor district, where property prices were among the lowest 
in the whole city. The presence of the stadium significantly increased the value 
of the surrounding areas, which has already translated into increased charges for 
perpetual usufruct of land. 
 
Sponsoring as a modern form of financing sports facilities  
The third and last source of generating income, available to sport stadiums 
comes down to winning over sponsors, including the titular sponsor to whom the 
naming rights are granted. Name sponsoring in Europe has a relatively short 
history, as it evolved into a larger scale phenomenon only in the late 20. century. 
Still, this form of financing has won supporters relatively quickly, and today is 
represented by the stadiums prepared for the World Football Championship 
2006 in Germany, i.e.: the Allianz Arena in Munich, Commerzbank Arena in 
Frankfurt, AOL Arena in Hamburg, Veltins Arena in Gelsenkirchen, Signal 
Iduna Park in Dortmund, and the AWD Arena in Hanover. The Allianz group 
alone paid EUR 110 million for having the Munich stadium bear its corporate 
name for 30 years. 
The development of name sponsoring in Poland has until recently only 
applied to clubs, league games, or events of lesser status. Sponsoring sports 
facilities comes as a new trend that has gained momentum with the construction 
of the Euro 2012 stadiums. PGE Arena in Gdańsk can serve as a good example. 
In December 2009 the competition for its titular sponsor was resolved. The 
power generators and distributors, Polska Grupa Energetyczna SA, will pay 
PLN 35 million for the right over the years 2010–2014. The terms of contract 
stipulate that the new sponsor enjoys the right to make use of the image and 
name of the stadium and use the facility under the granted advertising and 
commercial rights package. Since the annual operating costs of PGE Arena are 
estimated at PLN 12 million, the sponsorship means that at least 60% of the 
funds to cover the costs will come from the sale of the rights to the name alone. 
In addition to the title sponsor, the stadium in Gdańsk has had a so-called 
technology partner since 2010. It is a company named TRIAS, which agreed to 
pay PLN 300 000 per year for the privilege of using the stadium's image in the 
promotion of its business. 
In 2013, Poznań became the next city to have found a title sponsor. The 
largest alternative telecom operator in the Wielkopolska region – INEA and a 
consortium of Lech Poznań and Marcelin Management concluded an agreement 
for the term of 5 years. Apart from the new name of the stadium the package of 
sponsor's benefits includes the marking, marketing services connected with title 
sponsorship and execution of additional joint projects of the sponsor and 
stadium operator. For this privilege INEA agreed to pay to Lech an amount of 
PLN 3 250 000 in the first year of the term of the agreement and PLN 250 000 
more each following year.
 
Thus, the entire amount covered by the agreement is 
PLN 18 750 000 between 2013 and 2017. There are also clauses in the 
agreement that increase the extent of financing depending on the sporting 
achievements of Lech Poznań football club. For the title of Polish champion 
INEA shall pay an additional PLN 1 000 000. The same amount shall be paid for 
entering the group phase of UEFA Europe League. For entering the group phase 
of UEFA Champions League the club will receive an additional PLN 2 000 000. 
The negotiations in the two other host cities of the Euro 2012 are still in 
progress, and as at the close of 2012 have not been resolved. The most difficult 
situation seems to arise in the case of the National Stadium in view of the 
decision made by the Seym to name the facility after Kazimierz Górski. After 
all, it is difficult to imagine that the potential sponsor will be willing to have its 
name appear next to the patron’s name and the word “national”. 
Resume  
Table 4.4 provides an overview of the stadiums against the criteria of the 
generated costs and the plausibility of having them covered from different 
sources of income. Alongside such obvious elements such as the existence of the 
titular sponsor or the number of the VIP boxes offered, the table provides 
information on e.g. the size of the estate. The erection of any public facility, i.e. 
the category that all four arenas prepared for the Euro 2012 in Poland are 
classified in, entails the loss of income from real property tax. Bearing in mind 
the sizable expanse of land the structures occupy, this translates to a tangible 
depletion of the city budget income. Admittedly, the local authorities attempted 
to locate their arena projects in less developed city areas (Gdańsk and Wrocław, 
for instance) counting on increase in the value of the neighbouring property and 
an increase in the tax base that will translate to higher cash flow from the 
income tax to the entity’s budget in the future. This, however, is a time 
consuming process that may yield benefits years after the stadium has been 
opened for use. 
Obviously enough, management of a facility of the football stadium size 
requires not only searching for sources of income, but also reducing the 
operating costs, especially media consumption and work organisation of the 
labour employed to maintain the site. Even a single unconsidered action, to 
name e.g. turning on the lights in the stadium, can cost PLN 30 thousand [Pyrcz, 
2012]. In order to develop the optimal plan of managing energy use, it is 
necessary to understand how the demand of the site changes depending on the 
types of its use and the times of the day. Implementation of integrated 
management systems is very helpful in this respect, as they enable attaining 
maximum functionality, comfort and safety whilst minimising the stadium 
operating costs. Systems of the kind can be exemplified by the Building 
Management System (BMS), which manages the building – i.e. distribution of 
power, cool or hot air, and enables central control of the site. Manual operation 
of the control panel typically studded with thousands of switches is time 
consuming, costly, and builds the risk of error.  
 
Table 4.  
Characteristics of the stadiums in terms of their maintenance costs and the potential 
sources of income following the end of the Euro 2012 
 
Item National Stadium PGE Arena 
City Stadium 
in Poznań 
City Stadium 
in Wrocław 
Monthly projected 
maintenance 
costs 
PLN 1.5 million PLN 1 million PLN 0.5 million PLN 1 million 
Titular sponsor  no yes yes no 
Number of VIP 
boxes (box-
offered seats) 
69(800) 40(496) 45(480) 30 (2130) 
Additional 
infrastructure, 
commercial space 
included 
 conference hall 
for 2 thousand, 
 four restaurants, 
 shops, 
 office space, 
 - fitness club. 
 catering outlets,  
 shops, 
 pubs, 
 restaurants, 
 fitness club,  
 Lechia Gdańsk 
shop and 
museum,  
 rollerblade 
track. 
 34 catering 
outlets 
 a luxury banquet 
hall, 
 sport bars, 
 drink bars, 
 catering outlets 
at the stadium 
and the 
esplanade, 
 conference 
rooms, 
 Data Center. 
Estate size 18 ha 27 ha 25.5 ha 16.5 ha 
Capacity of the 
parking facilities 
1765 2171 1600 4466 
 
Source: Zawadzki 2013. 
 
Little time has passed since the close of the Euro 2012, hence arriving at a 
clear opinion on the operators’ efforts is difficult. For the time being, all arenas 
are generating a deficit, yet the representatives of their operators emphasise that 
the effectiveness of managing sites of that size should be assessed in a long time 
perspective. Each of the operators has adopted the deadline of at least 3 years to 
reach the break-even. In order to attain the set goal, the operators strive at 
maximizing the income from sports and non-sports activities, reducing the 
operating costs, increasing the durability of the facility and consequently making 
it more attractive to event organisers. All those elements determine the potential 
of generating income in the long term. 
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